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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2114
MARIO DIAZ MALDONADO,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT A. OLANDER, WARDEN; WILLIAM J. BEERS, LIEUTENANT;
WHITE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; VOLPE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER;
LAMBERT, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, NORTHAMPTON COUNTY (DEPT.
OF CORRECTIONS); SHOUDT, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; AXELDARE,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; AXELBAND, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

_________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
(D.C. No. 02-cv-1922)
_________________________________
Argued on March 25, 2004
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and
JOHN R. GIBSON,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 13, 2004)

*

The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Mario Diaz Maldonado, a former inmate at Northampton County Prison, brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five corrections officers. He alleged that the officers
used excessive force in restraining him after a fight with another inmate, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court entered
judgment after the jury returned a verdict for the defendant officers. Maldonado appeals,
arguing that the district court erred when it excluded evidence of the internal affairs
investigation that occurred at the prison after the incident. We affirm.
In April 2000, Maldonado was incarcerated at Northampton County Prison, where
guards intervened in a fight between Maldonado and another inmate. After receiving a
letter from another inmate about the incident, the warden of the prison asked the acting
internal affairs officer, Michael Pittaro, to investigate. Pittaro's investigation consisted of
reading the officers' written reports of the incident and possibly interviewing two of the
officers.1 During the investigation, Maldonado signed a written release drafted by Pittaro
stating that he did not want to pursue charges and did not want the incident referred to the
District Attorney for an investigation. Pittaro testified in his deposition that he drafted the
unique document and offered it to Maldonado to protect himself, in case Maldonado
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Pittaro does not recall speaking to any of the defendants during his investigation, but two
of the officers recall speaking with him.
2

alleged at some future time that he had wanted to pursue charges but Pittaro had refused
to investigate. Maldonado alleges that in exchange for signing the release, Pittaro offered
him a transfer to the state prison in which he was formerly housed and no disciplinary
action. If Maldonado did not sign, he would be sent back to Northampton for 100 days of
solitary confinement.
Maldonado filed this action alleging that the five corrections officers used
excessive force in restraining him after the fight. Prior to trial, the defendants filed a
motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of Pittaro's internal affairs investigation,
including the release signed by Maldonado. The defendants argued that the evidence was
irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. In the alternative, the defendants argued
that the evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the defendants
and confusion of the issues. Maldonado opposed the motion, arguing that this evidence
was relevant as direct evidence of what Pittaro learned from the officers and because the
drafting of the release illustrated Pittaro's tacit acknowledgment of the officers'
wrongdoing.
After hearing argument from both sides, the district court decided not to allow the
plaintiff to introduce evidence of Pittaro's investigation. The district court reasoned that
the evidence was about what individuals other than the defendants might have done and
what conclusions they may have reached on their own and therefore did not bear on the
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incident itself, especially when the plaintiff was not claiming there was a pattern or
practice of excessive force at the prison under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Thus, the district court concluded that the evidence "would go far afield and
be prejudicial." However, the district court noted that Maldonado had the right to call
Mr. Pittaro to testify:
With regard to Mr. Pittaro's testimony, however, if you want to put Mr.
Pittaro on the stand and ask him, what may have been said to him by any of
the parties in this matter, you certainly have every right to do that. Any
admission made to Mr. Pittaro may be brought before this jury, but what -what he may have concluded as a result of what he was told and any action
that he may have taken on his own, is excluded.
Maldonado did not call Pittaro as a witness during the trial.
In general, we review a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for
abuse of discretion. Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1341 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, if the district court makes a tentative ruling excluding the evidence but suggests
that it would reconsider the ruling at trial, the party must attempt to introduce that
evidence at trial in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. Walden v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1997). If the party does not, we review only
for plain error. Id.
Thus, whether the district court's ruling was "definitive" in excluding the evidence
or only "tentative" determines our standard of review. When the district court excluded
the evidence, it explicitly mentioned the option of calling Pittaro to testify. Maldonado's
counsel asked the court to clarify what he could and could not ask Pittaro while on the
4

stand. The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: "Well, Counsel, I'm going to have to take it as it comes,
because -DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, that's fair, your Honor.
THE COURT: -- I don't know exactly what -- where -- where it will go.
You -- I have indicated to you, that admissions of the defendants to M r.
Pittaro, any statements made by them to Mr. Pittaro are evidentiary. His
report and that material is not.
And you can try to develop through Mr. Pittaro what the defendants
said and I'll have to take it as it -- as it comes.
Although the district court made other statements to suggest its ruling was definitive, the
court never repudiated its statement that it would "take [] as it comes" any testimony by
Pittaro regarding the earlier investigation. Because the relevant question is whether the
district court's ruling to exclude was a definitive ruling with "no suggestion that it would
reconsider the matter at trial." Walden, 126 F.3d at 519 (emphasis added), we conclude
the ruling was tentative and review only for plain error. 2
The plain error doctrine "should only be invoked with extreme caution in the civil
context." Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d
Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1188 (2d Cir. 1995)). Thus,
"[a] finding of plain error is only appropriate in the civil context when the error is so
serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial." Walden, 126 F.3d at
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However, we would also affirm under the abuse of discretion standard of review
that would apply if the ruling was definitive or if Maldonado had made an offer of proof
concerning the investigation. We reject Maldonado's argument that we should review the
district court's Rule 403 ruling de novo.
5

521. Accordingly, we use the power to reverse for plain error "sparingly." Penn. Envtl.
Def. Found. (P.E.D.F.) v. Canon-McMillan Sch. District, 152 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir.
1998).
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as anything "having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R.
Evid. 401. Considering the low threshold of relevance, we will assume for the sake of this
appeal that the evidence Maldonado wished to admit was relevant to his claim of
excessive force. Cf. Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that report by institution's use of force committee was relevant in inmate's claim alleging
excessive force). Even if evidence is relevant, however, it may be excluded under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." This is an analysis that is best conducted by the district judge who was in the
courtroom; as we stated in United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978), "[i]f
judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is
reviewed by an appellate tribunal."
Maldonado argues on appeal that the district court erred in excluding the evidence
of Pittaro's investigation. Because no offer of proof was made, it is difficult for us to
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engage in a meaningful review of the evidence and understand the precise purpose for
which M aldonado would have offered the evidence. See Walden, 126 F.3d at 518 n.10.
However, Maldonado asserts that he "did not (and does not) intend to offer Mr. Pittaro's
investigatory report containing his conclusions as to whether the defendants used
excessive force. The plaintiff intended to question Mr. Pittaro only about the facts
learned in his investigation and his reasons for drafting the release." 3
The "facts" Pittaro learned in his investigation were either already in evidence or
were permitted to be introduced. Pittaro's investigation consisted of reading the
defendants' incident reports and possibly interviewing two of the defendant officers. The
incident reports Pittaro relied upon were admitted into evidence. The two officers who
allegedly spoke to Pittaro testified, as did the inmate whose letter prompted the
investigation. Thus, the district court's exclusion of the report precluded the presentation
of cumulative evidence and ensured that the jury would not give undue weight to Pittaro's
understanding of the facts. Cf. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding exclusion of employee review officer's report concluding that guard had used
excessive force on Rule 403 grounds because it was cumulative and more prejudicial than
probative, giving rise to concern that the jury would give "inordinate weight" to the
hearing officer's conclusions). There was no plain error.
3

This is consistent with Maldonado's oral representation to the district court that he "did
not intend to produce any evidence of what [Pittaro's] conclusions were . . . . " To the extent that
Maldonado challenges the district court's ruling because he wanted to introduce the fact of the
investigation itself, the ruling was not plain error.
7

Likewise, the district court did not commit plain error in excluding evidence of the
release and the circumstances surrounding Maldonado's signing of it. Maldonado argues
that the release drafted by Pittaro was admissible to show the defendants' "consciousness
of guilt." Maldonado essentially suggests that because the release was specially drafted,
and because Pittaro allegedly bribed Maldonado into signing it by promising him no
disciplinary action and a desired transfer, Pittaro must have concluded that the defendants
did something bad. The release was therefore intended to protect the defendant officers
and thwart any further investigation. The district court did not commit plain error by
rejecting this quite tenuous inferential chain. First, for Maldonado's inferential sequence
to work, the defendants must have said something incriminating to Pittaro during the two
interviews. However, the district court explicitly allowed Maldonado to call Pittaro and
question him on the substance of those conversations; Maldonado chose not to do so.
Second, Maldonado fails to cite a case where the "consciousness of guilt" principle was
applied in the civil context. Third, the release itself contained no language that could
have given rise to an inference that excessive force had been used. It did not describe any
force allegedly employed, why it was employed, or by whom. Finally, even if the
principle applied, the record is devoid of evidence that Pittaro was acting at the behest of
the defendants. Compare United States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 455 (3d Cir. 1993)
(evidence of a third party's threat to testifying witness during trial admissible to show
defendants' consciousness of guilt when there is evidence in the record suggesting a link
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between the defendants' organization and the third party). Because evidence of Pittaro's
actions in this regard may have unduly confused the issues for the jury, it and was
properly excluded by the district court.
We will affirm the judgment of the district court.
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